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Abstract
We estimate the role of benets and peer eects in technology adoption using data from
randomized distribution of menstrual cups in Nepal. Using individual randomization, we estimate
causal eects of peer exposure on adoption; using dierences in potential returns we estimate
eects of benets. We nd both peers and value inuence adoption. Using the fact that we
observe both trial and usage of the product, we examine the mechanisms driving peer eects. We
nd that peers matters because individuals learn how to use the technology from their friends,
but that they do not aect individual desire to use the cup.
1 Introduction
Why do some individuals or rms adopt new technologies faster or at higher rates than others? This
question is of importance to economists in a variety of elds (industrial organization, labor,
development, marketing, etc), and has both positive and normative implications. On the positive
side, knowing determinants of adoption can help predict adoption patterns (for example, which rms
are likely to be rst movers, and therefore leap ahead when new technology is introduced); on the
normative side, this may help us understand how to encourage adoption of benecial technologies
(for example, fertilizer or vaccinations in the developing world) or understand how to optimally
market new goods. Economic analysis of this question naturally starts with evaluating how variation
in technology costs and benets inuence dierences in adoption (Oster and Quigley, 1977; Oster,
1982; Caselli and Coleman, 2001; David, 1990; Luque, 2002; Duo et al, 2005). Griliches (1957, 1960,
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11962) produced some of the earliest work on this, arguing that the timing of hybrid corn adoption
across US states was a function of dierences in hybrid productivity.
Economists and sociologists have also explored the role of social interactions, networks or
peer eects in driving adoption (Ryan and Gross, 1943; Saloner and Shepard, 1995; Skinner and
Staiger, 2005). In response to Griliches (1957), a number of sociologists argued that social factors
were likely to be more important than productivity dierences in driving hybrid corn adoption
(Brandner and Straus, 1959; Havens and Rogers, 1961). Estimating the role of peers or social
interactions in driving adoption (or in determining behavior in general) is made dicult by the
problem of correlated unobservables between peers and, especially, between friends (Manski, 1993).
As a result, economists and others have focused on a variety of econometric techniques to disentangle
peer eects from correlated unobservables (Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Conley and Udry 2008;
Munshi 2003; Figlio 2003; Bandiera and Rasul 2006) including, more recently, explicit randomization
(Sacerdote 2000; Kremer and Levy 2006; Mobius, Rao and Rosenblat 2007; Duo and Saez 2003;
Godlonton and Thornton 2008; Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Duo, Kremer, and Robinson 2006;
Miguel and Kremer 2007).
The results on peer eects are some what mixed. Much of the literature (e.g. Foster and
Rosenzweig, 1995; Conley and Udry, 2008) nds peer exposure has a positive impact on technology
adoption, while recent (randomized) work has found either negative peer eects (Miguel and Kremer,
2007) or no eects (Duo, Kremer, and Robinson, 2006). One way to make progress on reconciling
these results is to examine what mechanisms drive peer eects. There are at least three possible
drivers of positive peer eects: individuals benet from behaving like their friends, individuals learn
about the benets of the technology from their friends, and individuals learn about how to use a new
technology from their friends. We can see immediately that some of these { for example, learning
from friends about how to use a technology { are likely to operate only in cases where the technology
is hard to use, which could be useful in explaining dierences across products in the existing
literature. However, even with randomization it typically has not been possible to identify which of
these factors are most important in driving peer eects (Duo and Saez 2003; Munshi and Myaux,
2006).1
In this paper we use data from a randomized evaluation of menstrual cup distribution in
Nepal to: (1) estimate the role of product value and peer inuence in adoption of a new technology;
1A partial exception is Miguel and Kremer (2007) who nd negative peer eects, which eectively rules out two of
the three explanations above (wanting to behave like friends and learning from friends); this is discussed in more detail
below.
2(2) evaluate the relative magnitude of these inuences in this particular case and (3) provide some
initial evidence on what mechanisms drive the peer eects. A menstrual cup is a small, silicone,
bell-shaped device which is used internally during menstruation; it is completely unfamiliar to our
subjects at the start of the study and is unavailable for purchase in Nepal. We enrolled a sample of
198 adolescent girls and their mothers in four schools in Chitwan, Nepal and randomized (at the
individual level) allocation of menstrual cups to half of the sample. Subjects were followed for
approximately eighteen months and detailed data was collected on cup usage over this time.2
We argue that although the menstrual cup may not be per se as important as some other
technologies (fertilizer, vaccines, contraceptives), this setting has a number of advantages for
understanding patterns of technology adoption. First, the individual randomization will allow us to
estimate causal peer eects. Second, we have clear and observable (if not necessarily exogenous)
variation in the value of the product, which will alow us to estimate the role of \productivity" in
driving adoption. Further, having value and peer measures together allows us to compare the relative
magnitudes. Third, we have data on cup adoption over time, which will allow us to observe whether
these eects change as the product becomes more familiar. Finally, we observe individual reports on
both trial and usage of the cup, which we argue will allow us to make progress on identifying the
mechanisms behind the peer eects. Overall, we argue that these features of the study allow us to
draw fairly sharp conclusions which contribute signicantly to our understanding of adoption
patterns, and are informative about other technologies which may be more dicult to study directly.
We rst use our data to estimate the importance of cup value (benets and costs) and peers
in individual adoption decisions. In this rst part of the paper we parallel the existing literature in
focusing on whether individuals report using the product. Beginning with cup value, we nd some
evidence that cost and benet factors drive usage. Girls who have a greater need for mobility { those
who work for pay { are more likely to adopt. Further, those for whom their existing technology is
more costly { those who report spending more time each month cleaning menstrual cloths { are more
likely to adopt. Other measures of benets to adoption { how far girls have to travel to school, and
whether they ever use menstrual pads { do not seem to matter on their own. Jointly these eects are
strongly signicant, and reasonably large: girls who work for pay are about 20 percentage points
more likely to adopt, and every ten minutes of washing cloths increases usage by 3 percentage points.
We then estimate the role of peers in driving adoption. At the baseline survey, girls were
2This study also evalauted the impact of menstrual cups on school enrollment; those results are reported in Oster and
Thornton, 2009.
3asked to list their closest friends, allowing us to identify friendships. Since access to the cups was
randomized at the individual level, number of friends in the treatment group is random (conditional
on number of total friends), which allows us to estimate causal eects of friend cup ownership on
behavior. Further, we are able to identify variations across friendship types { dierentiating between
strong friendships (where each individual lists the other as a friend) and weak friendships (where the
link is only one sided). We nd evidence that peers are important in driving adoption. These eects
are also large; one additional friend with the cup increases usage by about 18 percentage points three
months into the study. Strong friendships are more important than weak friendships in driving
adoption.
Turning to variation in adoption over the sample period, we nd the eects of cup value are
fairly consistent over time. However, the peer eects are much stronger at early months in the study.
By six months after distribution, the eect of friends on usage is not signicant.
These estimates suggest both cup value and peer eects matter, but the coecient
magnitudes do not address the relevant policy question: would overall usage be maximized by
targeting distribution based on cup value, peer networks, or neither? To explore this, we use our
estimates to evaluate product usage under three hypothetical scenarios. First, random distribution.
Second, value-based distribution (distributing the product to girls with the highest predicted value).
Third, peer-based distribution (distribute the product based on peer networks to maximize the
number of treatment friends). Our results suggest that both peer-based and value-based distribution
dominate random distribution overall. In early months, peer-based and value-based distribution are
similarly eective; in later months, and overall, value-based distribution dominates.
Having established a role for both cup value and peer inuences in driving adoption, we
then attempt to identify the mechanisms through which the peer eects, in particular, operate. As
noted above, there are at least three possible mechanisms driving positive peer eects: individuals
want to act like their friends, individuals learn about the benets of the technology from their
friends, and individuals learn from their friends about how to use a new technology. Most of the
literature has not attempted to separate these explanations.3 An exception is Miguel and Kremer
(2007), who estimate peer eects on adoption of de-worming drugs, and explicitly distinguish
between these three avenues of peer eects. They nd negative peer eects { individuals with more
peers in early adopter schools are less likely to adopt { which eectively rules out either imitation or
3The few cases, primiraily in sociology and demography, in which eorts have been made to distinguish between these
mechanisms tend to be plagued by the same type of identication problems inherent in all non-experimental estimates
of peer eects (Kohler, Behrman and Watkins, 2001)
4learning about how to use the technology as drivers of peer eects, since both of those would
produce positive peer eects. In our case, of course, we nd positive peer eects, and hence cannot
rule out any of these possibilities out of hand.
We will focus in our analysis on separating peer eects on wanting to use from peer eects
on success at usage. We argue that peer eects on usage success point to learning how to use the
technology from peers, whereas eects on wanting to use point to either an imitation or
learn-about-value mechanism. We are not able to separate out the latter two explanations.
In our data, in each month, we observe individual reports on cup trial and cup usage: did
the girl try the cup, and was she able to use it? There is a clear parallel between cup trial and
wanting to use, and between cup usage conditional on trial and success at usage. However, it is
important to note that what we observe in our data does not directly map into wanting to use and
success at usage. For example, the decision to try the cup will be aected both by how much
someone wants to use it and by how likely it is they think they will be successful. In Section 4 we
present a model of the adoption process, involving two stages { a decision about wanting to use, and
a deterministic success at usage { and show the assumptions (both in the theory and in the
estimation) necessary to translate what we observe in the data into estimates of peer eects on
wanting to use and success at usage.
Our results { based on the assumptions in the model { provide strong support for the claim
that friends are helpful in learning how to use the cup. In early months in the sample, having one
additional treatment friend increases the probability of successful usage by 25 percentage points.
This eect dissipates over time, perhaps reecting the concave value of information (i.e. after six
months even girls with fewer treatment friends have a large number of friend exposures). In contrast,
we nd no evidence that peer exposure impacts desire to use the technology { there are some overall
eects of peers on cup trial, but they appear to be due to peer inuence on expected success.
Notably, our estimates in this section also suggest that, when we focus on trial alone (i.e.
ignore the dierence in success rates across individuals), we nd much stronger evidence that
benets and costs matter. This suggests that benets and costs actually have an even larger eect
on wanting to use the product, and their eect on overall usage is muted by varying probabilities of
success, although (as noted) it is more dicult to interpret these benet and cost measures causally.
Returning to the issue of policy, our results suggest that with a product that is easy to use,
there is only limited argument for peer-based targeting. In contrast, with a product which is dicult
to use, peer-based targeting may dominate random distribution and value-based targeting, especially
5in a situation in which there is relatively limited heterogeneity across individuals in product value.
To the extent that peer eects have more often been found in cases where the product is dicult to
use (for example, high yield seeds), and not in cases where the product is easy to use (i.e.
de-worming drugs), these results may shed some light on why that occurs in the data.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting, the
experimental design, the menstrual cup and the data that we will be using. Section 3 presents our
baseline estimates of the role of cup value and peer exposure in driving adoption, including
comparing the relative magnitudes. Section 4 then presents a simple framework for thinking about
the adoption decision, and provides our evidence on mechanisms. Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental Design, Survey and Data
The data and results in this paper come from a randomized evaluation of menstrual cups in
Chitwan, a district in South-western Nepal. Women and girls in this area, as in much of the rest of
Nepal, traditionally use cloths during menstruation to soak menstrual blood. These cloths can be
unsanitary if not washed carefully, but most importantly, are reported to be inconvenient and
uncomfortable. Sanitary pads are typically familiar to people, but not widely available or used, and
the use of tampons is extremely rare. In the evaluation, menstrual cups were distributed randomly
to half of the participants, as an alternative to rags, and take-up was observed over time.
2.1 Participants and Survey Timeline
Four schools in and around Bharatpur City in Chitwan District, Nepal were chosen to participate in
the study; of these, two were urban schools and two were peri-urban. The study began in November,
2006. Based on a school roster listing girls who were enrolled at the start of the school year, 60
seventh-grade and eighth-grade girls from each school were invited, with their mothers, to
participate in the study (this represented most of the 7th and 8th graders). Participation was
contingent on attendance at the rst study meeting. The girls were told that they would receive a
gift (pens and stickers) at the meeting, and their mothers received 100 Nepali Rupees (about $1.45).
If a mother was not available, girls were told they could bring an older female relative or guardian to
the meeting. Column 1 of Panel A of Table 1 shows the total number of girl participants in each
4Our results also show that peer eects dissapate over time; to the extent that some existing work has focused on
looking for peer eects at the end of a study { a long time after distribution { this could explain why they are not
observed.
6school; between 7 and 12 of the invited students in each school were not able to attend the meeting
and therefore did not participate in the study. Columns 2 and 3 in Panel A show the composition of
the older female participants: 79% of girls participated with their mothers.
At the initial study meeting, a baseline survey was administered to the girls and their
mothers. This survey included basic demographic information, as well as questions about school
performance, menstruation and self-esteem. At the end of this initial meeting, the randomization
was carried out. Girls had been given identication numbers, and the randomization was done with
a public lottery, drawing twenty-ve numbers out of a bag. Girls whose numbers were drawn were
assigned to the treatment group with their mother or guardian (we did not randomize girls and their
mothers separately). The treatment girls and their guardians were asked to remain at the meeting
and each were given a menstrual cup. A nurse gave detailed instructions to those in the treatment
group on the use of the menstrual cup.5
After the initial meeting, girls were followed for approximately fteen months (through
January, 2008). During this time, there was an in-school nurse visit approximately once per month,
at which time the treatment girls were asked about their experiences with the menstrual cup. Due to
attrition, the number of girls interviewed at each visit varied; although there was close to complete
coverage in the rst few months, typically approximately 80 of the 101 treatment girls were available
at each visit in later months.
In February, 2008 a second meeting was held in each school. At this meeting a follow-up
survey, similar to the baseline survey, was administered. In addition, the control girls and their
female guardians were given the menstrual cup. One hundred and eighty-three of the girls in the
study attended the follow-up meeting. Of the 15 girls not able to attend the meeting all but one
were interviewed by enumerators at a later date (these included 7 treatment and 7 control girls).
2.2 Sanitary Technology
The sanitary technology we use is a menstrual cup, specically the MoonCup brand cup, shown in
Figure 1 (similar cups are sold under the name Keeper and Diva Cup).6 This product is a small,
silicone, bell-shaped cup which is inserted in the vagina to collect menstrual blood. For most women
the cup will have to be emptied approximately every twelve hours during menstruation. Between
5One of the mother-daughter pairs randomized to the treatment group decided not to accept the menstrual cup. We
analyze the intention to treat eect, and keep this girl in our sample for analysis. This girl and her mother were each
interviewed at the follow-up survey.
6For more information, see http://www.mooncup.co.uk/ .
7uses, the cup is washed with soap and water and stored in a cloth bag. With proper care, the cup is
re-usable for up to a decade. There is no risk of Toxic Shock Syndrome, and generally no risk of
complications from the cup. This menstrual cup has been FDA approved in the United States. The
MoonCup comes in two sizes: a smaller size for girls and women before childbirth, and a larger size
for women who have given birth, or who are over 30.
In the area of Nepal where our experiment takes place, the primary protection women use
during their period is menstrual cloths. These cloths are placed inside a woman's underwear to soak
up menstrual blood. The cloths are washed and re-used. The menstrual cup may be a signicant
improvement over this cloth technology for several reasons. First, if correctly inserted, women should
not noticed the presence of the menstrual cup and it will not impair mobility; the same cannot be
said for the cloths. Indeed, anecdotal evidence from Nepali women to whom we gave the cup as a
pilot suggested that increased mobility was a major advantage { women said they were able to
bicycle, and that they even forgot they were having their period. Second, cleaning the menstrual cup
for re-use is signicantly easier than cleaning the menstrual cloths. The cup should be washed with
soap and water, which takes only a minute or two; the cloths must be boiled and laundered, typically
by hand, which takes a (reported) average of 30 minutes per month. All of these factors { increased
mobility, ease of use, and no need to wash rags { were mentioned by girls at the follow-up survey as
advantages of the cup. Finally, it is possible that additional privacy is another advantage of the cup
{ in principle, use of the cup can be hidden, which is not possible when menstrual cloths must be
hung up outside to dry. Whether or not this is an advantage depends, in part, on whether girls and
women would prefer to hide their period.
We argue that the menstrual cup is well suited for studying determinants of technology
adoption. First, the technology is not available for purchase in Nepal, meaning we do not have to
contend with the concern that some girls know more about the technology initially than others do.
Second, the advantages of the cup { increased mobility, for example, or decreased time processing
cloths { will vary across individuals, allowing us to estimate the eects of benets and costs on
usage. Finally, although the MoonCup is comfortable to use for most women, it often takes time for
people to learn how to insert and remove it comfortably; indeed, when girls in our sample were asked
about disadvantages of the cup, the most common response (reported by 30% of the girls in the
sample) was \dicult to insert". The cup must be attened and folded in half in order to insert it
into the vagina and it takes some practice to position it correctly to prevent leakage. Given that
insertable reproductive devices are rare in Nepal, and that our main respondents were young
8adolescent girls who were just becoming familiar with their reproductive health, using this
technology was likely to take some practice. This suggests that there is scope for understanding the
learning component of technology adoption.
2.3 Data
This paper uses four primary elements of the data from the menstrual cup experiment: data on
demographics, data on cup adoption, data on cup costs and benets, data on friendships and basic
demographics.
Demographics: From the baseline survey we make use of a number of control variables on
demographics (age, grade, etc), which are summarized in Panel B of Table 1. The average age is 14,
and girls are evenly divided between the 7th and 8th grades, as was designed by the stratied
randomization. Forty-seven percent of the girls are of Hindu ethnicity (while other ethnic groups
consist of Tibetan-Burmese, Tharu, or Newari). Eight-seven percent of girls have had their period at
the baseline survey. Education rates among parents are low, but not zero: mothers have an average
of about 2.7 years of education, fathers an average of 5.6 years.
Information on Cup Adoption: As mentioned in Section 2.1, after the menstrual cups were
distributed at the baseline survey a nurse followed up with roughly monthly visits to the school, at
which time data was collected about cup usage. During the nurse visit, each girl in the treatment
group was asked if she had used the menstrual cup during her period that month. Although the
verbal responses dier across girls typical responses include quotes such as, \I use it and feel it is
easy", \I couldn't insert so I haven't used it" or \I am afraid to try it". From these responses we
coded whether the girls tried the menstrual cup and whether they used it. For example, the rst
quote here would be coded as both trying and using (by denition we assume that in order to use
one must try), the second quote would be coded as trying but not using and the third would be
coded as not trying or using.
To give a sense of the basic patterns of adoption, Figure 2 shows trial and usage of the
menstrual cup over the course of the study; the numbers above each data point report the sample
size in that month. Although the nurse aliated with our study made an eort to talk with each
individual in each month, some girls were not in school during the visits. Usage of the menstrual cup
increases dramatically in the rst six months, from 10% in January to 60% in June. After this, usage
is fairly constant, with little movement from June, 2007 to January, 2008. The pattern for trial of
the cup is similar, although the line is atter. Trial increase only from 60% to 80% over the rst
9months of the study; trial rates decline some in the period after that, likely reecting a decrease in
girls who continue to try without using.
Given our reliance on the adoption data, a central issue is whether the girls reported cup
usage accurately reect their actual cup usage. Although we are unable to determine this entirely,
we have evidence of high levels of cup usage using other features of the data. For the rst 10 months
of the project, we collected monthly time diaries from each girl. Girls reported their activities for the
rst 6 days of each month including their time spent on cooking, domestic and agriculture work, and
schooling, for example. Using these time diaries, we observe signicant dierences in time use on
days girls are menstruating. We observe that girls in the control group spend approximately 22
minutes more doing laundry on days when they are menstruating. This is presumably due to the
extra time needed to wash their menstrual rags. In contrast, treatment girls who are menstruating
spend 20 minutes less time doing laundry than control girls who are menstruating. Further, the high
levels of usage are conrmed in the follow-up survey. While both the time diary and the follow-up
survey are also self-reports, they point to a level of internal consistency which we think is supportive
of the validity of our adoption data.
Cup Costs and Benets: As noted in the discussion of the menstrual cups above, two clear
advantages of the menstrual cup, relative to the existing technology of menstrual cloths, are
increased mobility and decreased time washing rags. This suggests that any activities which aect
the need for mobility across girls could aect the benet of the menstrual cup, and on the converse
side, variations in time it takes to wash menstrual cloths might aect the relative cost of the
menstrual cups. We identify several variables which measure relative benets and costs: whether the
girl works for pay or not and how long it takes her to get to school (both related to the need for
mobility), reported time it takes to wash cloths each month at the baseline survey, and whether the
girl had ever used pads at the baseline (since pads are more convenient than cloths). These variables
are summarized in Panel C of Table 1. Roughly 45% of the girls in the sample ever work for pay;
they travel an average of 15 minutes to school, and spend 30 minutes per month washing menstrual
cloths. Twenty-two percent of the sample had ever used sanitary pads.7
Data on Friendships: The object of interest when we consider eects of peers on technology
adoption will be the number of friends who also received the cup. We use data on friendships
collected in the baseline survey. In this survey, before the randomization took place, each of the girls
7We use \ever use pads" rather than \use pads regularly" since, consistnet with our claim of limited sanitary pad
usage, only 2% of the girls in the sample report using pads regularly.
10was asked to list their three closest friends who were also at the meeting. On average, girls listed 2.6
close friends with 68 percent listing 3 friends and 25 percent listing 2 friends (Table 1, Panel C). This
information allows us calculate friendships, and number of friends. Our primary measure of
friendships is total friends, which includes everyone whom the individual lists as a friend and anyone
who lists them as a friend. On average, each girl had 3.8 total friends with a maximum of 7 friends.
In addition, we consider two subsets of total friends: strong friendships (bilateral links only) and
weak friendships (unilateral links only). It would also be possible, in principle, to separate weak
friends into two groups by direction of listing. We have done this, but nd no dierences across the
weak friend types. We therefore focus on the weak versus strong distinction only.
In our survey we asked only about the three closest friends; we did not allow respondents to
list all of their possible friends. In practice, this truncation likely does not miss very many friends: in
the follow-up survey, we asked how many girls the respondent considered to be her close friend
(without truncating the total permissable friends) and 75% answered four or fewer, with a median
number of 3. In addition, given the randomization, we are able to obtain an unbiased estimate of the
impact of additional treatment friends even if we do not observe all of an individuals friends.
3 Eects of Benets, Costs, Peers on Technology Adoption
This section presents our baseline estimates of the determinants of adoption of the menstrual cup. In
this section, we are concerned with simply estimating the patterns in the data. In particular, we
hope to derive baseline, overall, estimates of the impact of cup value and peers on cup adoption. The
rst subsection below presents our empirical strategy, with a focus on how we estimate causal eects
of peers, and the second subsection presents our results. The third subsection briey discusses the
relative magnitude of the cup value and peer inuences.
3.1 Empirical Strategy
We estimate the relationship between cup usage, cup value and peers using the regression
specication below, which assumes a linear relationship between the variables of interest and usage.
Usedi =  + 1(Friend Exposurei) + 2(Benefitsi) + 2(Costsi) + Xi + i (1)
where Xi is a vector of controls (e.g., age, grade, test scores, school xed eects, parental education,
family income), and friend exposure is the number of friends in the treatment group. The unit of
11observation is the individual, and we note that these regression are estimated only for treatment
individuals. We begin by estimating this regression at three dierent points in time (March, 2007;
August, 2007 and January, 2008), which gives a sense of how the coecients vary over time. In each
case, the variable for usage is equal to one if the individual reported using the cup in that month and
zero otherwise. In addition, we will show analyses where we stack the observations and include all
months in a single regression, with an observation being an individual-month. The variables remain
the same, but in this case we will also control for a time trend and cluster standard errors by
individual.
There are identication issues in estimating the inuence of benets and costs on adoption,
and in estimating peer eects. The latter identication issue is much more obviously problematic,
and we therefore address that rst. The basic issue, as outlined by Manski (1993) is the reection
problem: friends often have similar characteristics, meaning if we observe friends acting similarly, it
is dicult to separate whether they act similarly because they are inuencing each other or because
they were ex ante similar. Here we use explicit randomization to identify the peer eects.
Consider rst the case without randomization; for example, if our data was from a cross
section of girls for whom we observed product ownership/usage and friendships. It would certainly
be possible to estimate Equation (1) in this setting, where the measure of friend exposure is friend
ownership or usage of the cup. However, it is not possible to interpret these coecients causally: if
individual characteristics are correlated with friend characteristics, it is possible that individuals who
own the cup also have friends who own the cup not because they learn from their friends, but
because they are similar to them.
In contrast, in our evaluation we randomly allocate ownership of the menstrual cup. The
randomization is at the individual level, so not only is individual ownership random, but the number
of friends who own the cup is also random (conditional on total number of friends).8 This means
that we can estimate the causal impact of friend ownership (number of treatment friends) on
individual usage. It is important to note here, however, that we cannot estimate the impact of friend
8Our measure of friend exposure is number of treatment friends. This is random only conditional on total number
of friends; we will therefore condition on total number of friends when we do this analysis. To see why conditioning
on total number of friends address this issue, denote Y 2 f0;1g the individual binary outcome (uses or not) and D as
the number of friends in the treatment group. The object we hope to estimate is  = Pr(Y = 1jD = )   Pr(Y =
1jD =    1) that is, the dierence in the potential outcome (using the technology) when the individual has one
fewer friend. We do not observe the same person with both  and    1 friends, and what we estimate empirically
is ^  = Pr(Y = 1jD = )   Pr(Y 1 = 1jD =    1) Assume that each individual has a constant number of total
friends H (empirically, this is achieved by controlling for total number of friends). Whether each of these friends is in
the treatment group is random. As a result, conditional on H, the number of treatment friends is random. This means
that Pr(Y = 1jD = ) = Pr(Y 1 = 1jD = ) = Pr(Y jD = ) and similarly for Pr(Y 1). As a result,  = ^  and
the estimation generates unbiased estimates of the treatment eect of friends on adoption.
12usage on individual usage; we can only measure the eects of friend ownership. Friend usage,
conditional on ownership, is likely to be determined by the same unobservables as individual usage,
so this coecient would not have a causal interpretation. The eect of having more treatment
friends includes many elements: the eects of friends on knowledge about how to use the product,
any stigma associated with the product, the eect of your friends having seen the product, etc.
There are also concerns with identifying causal eects of benets or costs of the cup. Our
measures of these variables { distance to school, working, time spent washing menstrual cloths { may
be correlated with other individual demographics like income or parental education. Although we
control for the most obvious of these (parental education and income), there may be some that are
omitted. Unfortunately, we do not have exogenous variation in these measures which lessens our
ability to make causal statements about the eect of cup benets and costs. However, there are two
encouraging notes. First, at least one of these variables { time washing cloths { is inuenced largely
by the length and ow volume of the period, which is arguably exogenous. Second, empirically we do
not see much correlation between standard demographics and adoption behavior, suggesting the
omitted variable bias may be small. It is also worth noting that, from the standpoint of using these
variables for prediction or forecasting, the possibility of omitted variable bias is less important.
Balancing on Observables: Before we present the main results, it is useful to briey address
whether our data is balanced on observables, which is an indication of a valid randomization
procedure and is important for comparing individuals with more or fewer treatment friends. The
treatment and control group were generally balanced on observable characteristics (Panel A of Table
2). There was no dierence in number of friends, previous use of menstrual pads, or whether a girl's
father had knowledge of when the girl got her period. There is a ten percentage point dierence in
the likelihood of having started her period. All results below are robust to excluding any girl who
did not have her period at baseline.9
Although comparison of treatment and control are important as a general validation, the
analysis below uses variation in number of treatment friends. Given this, perhaps the more relevant
issue is whether the data is balanced across groups with dierent numbers of treatment friends. Of
course, number of treatment friends is only random conditional on total number of friends, so we can
ask whether number of treatments friends is correlated with these variables in a regression in which
9This imbalance may prompt concern that the cup was strategically given to girls who were already menstruating.
Extensive discussions with the survey team suggest this was not likely to be the case. In addition, there is no evidence
that the cup was more likely to be given to mothers who were still menstruating (89.7% menstruating in treatment group;
86.9% in comparison, p=.54), alleviating this concern somewhat.
13we condition on total friends. Coecients on number of treatment friends from these regressions are
shown in Panel B of Table 2. These coecients suggest the randomization was successful, at least
relative to observables. In nearly all cases there is no signicant relationship between the
demographic variables and number of treatment friends. Of the twelve tests, only one (minutes to
school) is signicant at the 10% level, consistent with what we would expect based on chance.
3.2 Estimating Determinants of Adoption
Table 3 presents our baseline results on adoption, estimating the relationship between cup usage in
dierent periods and our independent variable measures of costs, benets and peer exposure.10
Columns 1-3 estimate the relationship for three months of the study { the beginning (March, 2007),
midway through (August, 2007) and at the end (January, 2008). We see some evidence that benets
matter: girls who work for pay and those who report spending more time washing menstrual cloths
are more likely to use the cup, although these eects are not strongly signicant. At the bottom of
the table we present p-values for the test that these are jointly signicant in the correct direction; we
nd that this is only the case in the nal month in the sample.11
In Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 we show our analyses of the stacked data, where an
observation is an individual-month; this may allow for greater precision. Column 4 analyzes the
overall eect of these variables on adoption and nds stronger evidence that benets and costs
matter. In particular, girls who work for pay are 20 percentage points more likely to use the cup,
and each additional ten minutes of washing rags increases cup usage by 3 percentage points. The
joint test of all of the coecients together is strongly signicant. In Column 5 we interact these
measures with time. We do not nd any signicant variation in the eect of working over time,
although the coecient on time washing rags is larger in later months. Again, jointly the eects of
cup value are highly signicant in this stacked regression.
Turning to peer eects, we again report on the regressions in Table 3. We nd consistently
strong evidence that peers matter for adoption. Increased peer exposure to the cup increases usage,
much more so in early months. In March, three months after distribution, one additional treatment
friend increases usage by around 12 percentage points (Column 1). Eects in the middle and later
10This table reports marginal eects from probit regressions. Rather than the marginal eect evaluated at the average,
which is what the \dprobit" command does in Stata, however, we report the average of the marginal eects. Because
levels of adoption vary so widely by school there is really no \average" person in the data, when we include school
xed eects, and marginal eects from the \dprobit" command are implausibly large, and very dierent from the OLS
estimates.
11The coecient on time to school is actaully incorrectly signed relative to our theory; we therefore constrain the test
to test whether this coecient is positive.
14months are smaller and not signicant. Columns 4 and 5 are consistent with this pattern: the overall
eect of treatment friends is large and signicant in Column 4, and when we include the interaction
with time in Column 5 we nd a large positive main eect, and a negative and signicant
interaction. Figure 3 explores the timing of these eects in more detail and graphs coecients on
interactions between month dummies and number of treatment friends for each month after cup
distribution. Consistent with Table 3, the eects of peer exposure is large and signicant in early
months (through March) and positive but not signicant in the later months.
In general, we see very little eect of the demographic controls on adoption. The one strong
pattern is that there are a large variations across schools in adoption, with highest adoption in
school 1 and lowest in schools 3 and 4.12 One demographic control we might have expected to have
an eect is exam grade. The literature on technology adoption frequently cites levels of human
capital as predictive of early adoption (Oster and Quigley, 1977; Caselli and Coleman, 2001). In this
case, although we do not have variation in years of schooling we do have variation in exam scores,
which is an alternative measure of human capital. Although the coecients on this variable are
positive, they are not consistently signicant.
As we have noted, it is possible in our data to separate out dierent friendship types and to
explore which are more important in driving adoption. The regressions in Table 4 replicate Table 3,
but report eects by friendship type. Controls for our measures of benets and costs, and for
demographics, are included but not shown (full regressions are available from the authors). As
discussed, we use two measures of friends: strong friends (both girls list each other) and weak friends
(the friend lists the respondent, but not vice versa or the respondent lists the friend, but not vice
versa). We nd that strong friendships are more important than weak friendships. This is
particularly true later in the sample. The eect of weak friendships falls o very quickly, but the
eect of strong friendships persists.
The results here point most strongly to a role for peer exposure in driving menstrual cup
adoption. The eect of peers appears to be very large, especially early on and from strong ties.
Moving from zero friend with the cup to three friends with the cup increases early usage by
somewhere between 30 and 60 percentage points in early months. We also nd evidence for a role of
private returns to adoption (benets and costs) in driving take-up. Working for pay and spending
more time washing menstrual cloths are both predictive of adoption. These eects are also quite
12Because of the small sample size of the number of schools, it is not possible to attribute the lower or higher rates of
adoption in the schools to one factor.
15large: girls who work are 20 percentage points more likely to adopt early on, and increasing washing
time by 30 minutes per month increases the chance of adoption by 9 percentage points. However,
comparing the magnitudes of the eects in this way is not obviously informative about which set of
inuences is \more important"; the next subsection briey addresses this issue.
3.3 Evaluating Magnitudes: Relative Value of Distributions Schemes
There are, of course, a variety of ways we might consider evaluating the relative magnitudes of the
eects of value of a technology versus the eect of friendships on adoption. One possibility is, as we
do above, to simply compare the coecients magnitudes from Table 3. However, we argue this does
not address the clearest normative question: what distribution scheme would maximize adoption?
In this subsection, we use the estimates from Table 3 to address this question directly. We
consider three distribution schemes: random distribution, value-targeted distribution (use our
measures of value to predict usage, then distribute to the top half of the girls in terms of predicted
usage) and peer-targeted distribution (distribute the cup to individuals based on their peer networks,
with the goal of maximizing the average number of friends with the cup).
In each of the three cases we envision allocating the cup to half of the girls in the treatment
sample and predict their usage based on the coecients we estimate in Table 3. Figure 4 graphs
predicted usage under each distribution scheme, over time. Both types of targeted distribution
dominate the random distribution scheme. Even by the end of the period, predicted usage rates are
25 percentage points higher with value-based targeting, and 10 percentage points higher with
peer-based targeting. In the very early periods, both value and peer-based targeting give similar
gains; however, in the longer run, value-based targeting dominates. By the end of the period, usage
under the value-based targeting scheme is roughly 15 percentage points higher than with peer-based
targeting.
Overall, consistent with the argument that both peers and cup value matter for adoption,
we see both of these distribution schemes dominate random distribution. However, value-based
targeting ultimately dominates. This is, perhaps, surprising given that the coecient on friendships
are typically larger than the coecients on cup costs and benets. There are two factors which
contribute to this result. First, by the end of the sample the eect of peers are not signicant,
whereas the eect of benets continues to matter. Second, the gain in number of peers with the cup
is not enormous, relative to the random case, even when we target to maximize treatment friends.
Even though the eect of friends is large, the dierence in number of friends in the various
16conditions is not.
This methodology { considering dierent distribution schemes { could be applied to a
variety of technologies. However, the specic conclusion { that value-based targeting dominates { is
specic to the case of menstrual cups. Although this could be valuable for someone interested in
maximizing menstrual cup usage, we noted at the start of this paper that menstrual cups are not a
technology that policy-makers typically focus on. In order to make progress on whether these
conclusions are applicable to other types of technologies, we cannot stop at simply estimating the
eects of peers and benets on overall adoption: we need to understand better why these factors
matter. To the extent that we can identify, for example, that peers matter through learning how to
use rather than through imitation, that would suggest that peer-based distribution would be most
useful for hard-to-use technologies. With this as partial motivation, and the more general motivation
that understanding why peers matter is of interest, we turn to mechanisms.
4 What Mechanisms Drive These Eects?
The results above show that peer exposure and private cup value aects adoption. Why does this
occur? In this section we attempt to separate the some of the mechanisms by which peer eects, in
particular, could aect adoption. Peer exposure to the technology may matter because peers aect
the value of a technology, or because people learn about how to use the technology from their friends
(Duo and Saez 2003; Munshi and Myaux, 2005; Miguel and Kremer, 2007). Within the category of
peers aecting technology value, this could occur either because of imitation (individuals want to act
like their peers) or because peers aect individual perceptions about technology value (Miguel and
Kremer, 2007; Kohler, Behrman and Watkins, 2001). Separating out these mechanisms in the case of
peer eects is especially relevant in our case, where we nd positive peer eects and therefore cannot
rule out any of these possibilities without further exploration.
Our data has an unusual features which may allow us to make progress on separating out
these eects: we observe both trial and usage of the product. We argue that, under the assumptions
of the simple model outlined below, this will allow us to separate the eect of friends on technology
value from the eect of friends on knowledge about how to use the product. However, our data is not
sucient to fully separate all three mechanisms described above: we will be unable to draw
conclusions about whether friends aect cup value through imitation (people want to act like their
friends, so friends with the cup increase value) versus friends aecting cup value through learning
17about value from friends (the Miguel and Kremer (2007) mechanism). Despite this, we argue that
even separating peer eects on knowledge about how to use from peer eects on value represents
signicant progress.
One thing to note immediately { based only on the results in Section 3 { is that the fact
that the eect of peers varies over time is more consistent with one of the learning stories (learning
about how to use or learning about value) than with the imitation story. If peers matter because
people want to imitate their friends, these eects should persist over time. The fact that the eects
do not persist suggests that imitation is, probably, a small part of the story. As we will see, this
intuition is consistent with what we nd in the fuller analysis.
4.1 Mechanisms: Theoretical Framework and Estimation
We assume there are two stages in determining usage of a new technology. First, individuals decide
whether or not they would like to adopt; second, they may or may not be successful at adopting. We
posit that technology value aects the rst stage (whether or not an individual wants to adopt) and
knowledge about how to use aects the second stage (whether adoption is successful).
Denote the overall probability of cup usage as pu, the probability that an individuals wants
to use the cup as pw and the probability that they are successful at using the cup as ps and note that
pu = (pw)(ps). We are interested in how friends aect adoption. Denote the number of treatment
friends (i.e. friends with the cup) as f. Thus far, we have established that
dpu
df > 0; this is consistent
with either
dpw
df > 0 or
dps
df > 0, or both. We will argue that
dps
df > 0 indicates that friends matter
because they help people learn about how to use the cup;
dpw
df > 0 indicates that friends matter
because they aect cup value (either through imitation or through learning about value).
Peer Eects on Usage Success
Working backward, we begin by analyzing the second stage of the adoption process: success
at use. We assume that the success at usage is a function of knowledge about how to use the cup
and that this knowledge can be gained from friend exposures to the cup f; we denote success at
using ps(f).13 Importantly, we are assuming that this probability of success is deterministic { given
the knowledge an individual has, there is some xed probability of success. Put dierently, we
assume that success is not determined by individual eort, and there is no decision made by
individuals in this second stage. This is the crucial assumption in the model. It is also important in
13It is also likely over time { either through the nurse visits, mothers, other non-friend peers, etc { girls will gain
knowledge about the cup even without friend exposures. We abstract away from this in the model, but allow for it
empirically by controlling for a time trend where appropriate.
18interpreting our data. Specically, we interpret the reports we see in the data as reecting a two
stage process of \trial" and \usage".
Without this assumption we cannot separate these mechanisms. However, it is not the only
possible assumption. For example, one could think of this as a single decision about wanting to use,
in which success at usage simply reects how much the person wants to use, and how hard they are
willing to try. In that case, what we observe in the data would simply reect dierent intensities of
desired usage and it would not make sense to think about a two stage model. Ultimately, we feel
that our assumption is reasonable, but it's obviously important to keep in mind, given the role it
plays in our estimation of these mechanisms.
Turning to the data, we directly observe usage success { usage conditional on trial { but
only for individuals who try the cup. This introduces a potential selection problem. We discuss below
the possibility that girls with higher cup value will be more likely to try the cup. If this is true, and
if the impact of peer exposure on success is dierent for girls with high cup value than those with
low cup value, then estimates based on the selected set of girls who try the cup will be misleading.
We therefore provide two sets of estimates. First, we estimate
dps
df based on a simple OLS
regression of cup usage on friendship, restricting to girls who try the cup. These estimates will be
reasonable only if the selection bias is small or non-existent. Second, we estimate the same regression
using a Heckman selection model. This selection model requires us to identify some variable(s) which
inuence trial but do not inuence the ability to use; similar to the exclusion restriction in an IV
strategy, this selection model is only as good as the selection variable. In our case we have an
obvious candidate: variations in menstrual frequency. As is often true with adolescents, some girls in
our sample do not get their period in some months. This includes girls who had not begun
menstruation at the start of the study, but also includes some girls who simply missed their periods
in particular months. Since there is no ability to try the cup when a girl does not have her period,
but there is no reason to think this is otherwise correlated with ability to use, this provides an
appropriate selection criteria.14 In the end, this estimation allows us to identify whether friends
matter for learning how to use the cup. We will also estimate how these coecients vary over time.
Peer Eects on Wanting to Use
We next move to the rst stage of the decision process, when individuals decide whether or
not they want to use the cup. We model wanting to use the cup as a function of peers who have the
14Only about 4% of the individual-months in the data are girls who do not have their period that month. However,
the rst stage of the selection model is very strong, with a t-statistic of roughly 6 on the \No Period" measure.
19cup (f) and private cup benets (b). We denote the probability that the individual want to use as
pw(f;b). In this stage, we assume the individuals do make a decision, trading o the desire to use
against the costs of usage, which we denote i  H(:). Individuals will want to use the cup if
pw(f;b) > i. We are primarily interested in the parameter
dpw
df ; we will also provide estimates of
dpw
db , although based on the assumptions of the model these should be qualitatively similar to
dpu
db
(which is captured by the results in Section 3).
Turning to the data, we would ideally observe whether or not an individual wants to use the
cup; however, what we observe in the data is cup trial. These are not the same. In particular, denote
the girl's expected probability of successful use as E[ps(f)] (which is dened for everyone, regardless
of whether or not they try the cup). Assuming that the cost i is experienced even if the girl is not
successful at using, she will want to try if the equation below holds.
E[ps(f)]pw(f;b) > i (2)
This introduces the estimation challenge: observing that trial varies with friendship, given this setup,
is consistent either with an eect of friends on wanting to use or an eect of friends on expected
usage success. In order to estimate the eects of peers on wanting to use alone (
dpw
df ), we would
ideally like to use some exogenous shifter of E[ps(f)]. Unfortunately, there is no obvious candidate
for this type of variable. This will limit, to some extent, our ability to identify
dpw
df . However, we
argue there are several ways that we can use the assumptions of the model, and the features of the
data, to estimate this parameter.
Our rst strategy takes advantage of the structure of the model. In particular, we recall
that pu = pwps. We dierentiate this equation with respect to f, which gives the following expression
dpu
df = pw
dps
df + ps
dpw
df . Rearranging to give an expression for our quantity of interest,
dpw
df , yields
dpw
df
=
dpu
df   pw
dps
df
ps
(3)
This suggest that, if we can observe values for the elements on the right hand side of this equation,
we can provide an estimate for
dpw
df .
Note rst that we observe
dpu
df based on the analysis in the Section 3 (Table 3). In addition,
we argue above that we can estimate the eect of friends on success:
dps
df . The objects pw and ps are
the overall probability of wanting to use and success at usage. First, pw is the probability that
people want to use assuming they expect to be successful. We do not observe this directly in the
data, but note that by the end of the period (when expected success is close to 100%), we
20consistently nd about 75% of individuals trying the cup; given this, we assume that pw = 0:75.
Second, ps is the probability of success for all individuals, including those who do not use. We
estimate this from the second stage analysis described above: we run the regressions to estimate
dps
df ,
and predict ps from these same regressions. We use these values together to calculate
dpw
df , and
generate bootstrapped standard errors. Using this structural approach we can explore how the
eects of friends on wanting to use vary over time.
We also pursue two non-structural approaches to estimate
dpw
df . First, we limit the
estimation to situations in which E[ps(f)] ' 1; that is, we look for time periods or situations in
which success seems very likely. In particular, we note that success is much higher in later months of
the study (this can be seen in Figure 2), and explore whether the eect of friends is dierent in these
months. Second, we take advantage of a question in the follow-up survey asking about individual
\willingness to pay" for the cup. We dene willingness to pay based on a series of questions in which
girls were asked \would you be willing to pay X for the menstrual cup?" We code them as willing to
pay 500Rs if they say yes when X = 500Rs; willing to pay 1000Rs if they say yes when X = 1000Rs,
and so on up to 2500Rs. The average of this variable is 1380Rs, which is about $18. This is actually
quite a lot of money and the usual caveats about willingness to pay questions apply here.
Nevertheless, we feel that this variable indicates to some extent how much individuals value the cup.
We again focus on girls who have used the cup, for whom we expect E[ps(f)] = 1 and estimate
whether those with more friends have greater willingness to pay. Neither of these approaches will
allow us to estimate variation over time in the friendship eect.
Benet Eects on Wanting to Use
Focusing briey on the eect of cup benets on wanting to use, we note that in this model
we only allow benet to aect adoption through wanting to use. Under this assumption, regressing
either cup trial or cup usage on benets should give a similar estimate of the eect of benets on
wanting to use; the latter estimation is already done in Table 3. However, given the model above, it
is possible for these coecients to dier if the dierence between expected probability of success and
actual probability of success varies with benet levels. For example, if people with high cup benets
are systematically over-condent about their success, then we should estimate larger impacts of cup
benets on trial than on usage.
4.2 Results: Mechanisms
Peer Eects on Usage Success
21We begin by estimating the impact of friendships on success at using the cup. We estimate
two models: an OLS regression of usage conditional on trial, and a Heckman selection model. Figure
5 shows the coecient on number of treatment friends, over time, from the two types of models. We
note rst that, for most of the time period, usage success is signicantly higher for individuals with
more treatment friends. In early months after distribution this is as high as 25 percentage points per
treatment friend. There appears to be some downward trend in these coecients over time { the
eects are the largest at early months in the sample, although the variation over time is noisy.
Comparing the estimates for the OLS to the Heckman estimates we see very little dierence in the
coecient magnitudes, suggesting limited selection bias in this specication.
In addition to exploring variation over time visually, Table 5 estimates the eect of
treatment friends on success at using. To generate these regressions we stack the individual-month
observations and include all months in the regression (as in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3). Our
independent variable of interest is number of treatment friends. Columns 1 and 3 estimate the
baseline eects of treatment friend months on usage success, in the OLS and Heckman framework.
We nd, consistent with Figure 5, positive impacts. The estimates suggest that one additional
treatment friend increases the probability of usage success by around 10 percentage points. Columns
2 and 4 include interactions with month. Again consistent with Figure 5, we see the eect of friends
on success is very large in early months and decreases over time.
The evidence in Figure 5 and Table 5 suggest that peer exposure to this technology aects
adoption, at least in part, through eects on knowledge about how to use the cup, which results in
usage success. The estimates suggest that these eects are largest in early months after distribution.
This is consistent with some concavity in the ps(f): one additional friend exposure is more valuable
when the initial level of exposure is lower.
Peer Eects on Wanting to Use
We turn now to estimate how friendship aects wanting to use the cup, the rst stage of the
decision. We begin by showing the rst { naive { estimates of the impact of friendships on cup trial.
As we discuss above, seeing an impact of friendships on cup trial overall is consistent either with
friendship eects on wanting to use, or with anticipated friendship eects on success; since we know
from Table 5 that friends do aect success, this is particularly important. Columns 1 and 2 of Table
6 estimate these naive regressions (with regressions stacked at the individual-month level, as in Table
5). We see positive and statistically signicant eects of treatment friends on cup trial, although the
eects are smaller than what we see in Table 5. Column 2 indicates there is no signicant variation
22in these coecients over time.
In Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 we show our rst methodology for estimating
dpw
df , in this
case using the structure of the model.15 In contrast to Columns 1 and 2, we see no evidence that
friendships aect wanting to use. The coecient in Column 3 is about half the size of the coecient
in Column 1, and not signicant. Column 4, again, points to no variation over time.
Figure 6 graphs the coecients on number of treatment friends, by month, for the naive
estimates and the structural estimates. This graph gives some sense of what is driving the dierence
in coecients between Columns 1 and 3 of Table 6. In particular, in the naive estimates we see a
fairly large coecient on treatment friends in February, one of the early months in the sample. We
do not see this once we attempt to account for the inuence of friendships on success. It is, perhaps,
not surprising that we see the largest dierence in coecients in February, when the eect of friends
on usage success (in Figure 5) is largest.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 6 present the results of our other two tests. In Column 5 we limit
the sample to later months (after May) when the probability of success is closer to one. The
coecient is smaller than the comparable coecient on Column 1, and is not signicant; in fact, it is
quite close in size and signicance to the structural estimates in Column 3. Finally, in Column 6 we
estimate the eect of friends on willingness to pay for the cup, limiting to girls who have used the
cup at least once; the assumption is that they know they could be successful at using it, and we want
to explore how their reported cup value correlates with friends. The coecient is relatively small
relative to the variable mean. One additional treatment friend increases willingness to pay by an
insignicant 174Rs, or about $2 on a mean of $18.
Overall, the results here point toward the conclusion that friendships do not inuence
whether girls want to use the menstrual cup. Although in the baseline { naive { estimate there does
seem to be some eect on trial, that seems to be spurious, and more likely due to the fact that
people with more friends expect to be successful at using. It is important to note, however, that the
most we can conclude here is that friendships do not matter overall in this stage of the decision. We
noted above that at this stage there are two possible mechanisms: friendships mattering through
desire for imitation, and friendships mattering because friends help you learn about the benets of
the cup. It is possible that friends are a positive inuence through imitation, but a negative inuence
through learning about benets, and these balance out overall to zero. We think this is unlikely,
15Note that we do not report coeencts on controls here, since the estimates are generated based on running several
regressions and calculating a non-linear combination of coecients; standard errors are bootstrapped. In this sense there
are no \controls" to report, even though they are included in the regressions that generate this estimate.
23since we have little evidence that friends would have a negative inuence through learning. For
example, among the individuals who use the cup, 100% of them, at the follow-up survey, report that
they would recommend it to someone of their age (overall, including the girls who did not use, 95%
said they would recommend the cup). Nevertheless, we cannot draw strong conclusions about
separating these two mechanisms; we can say only that together their eect appears to be zero.
Benet Eects on Wanting to Use
Again, we turn briey to the eects of cup benets on wanting to use. The coecients in
Column 1 of Table 6 also provide the basis for this discussion. As we noted above, with appropriate
expectations we would expect these coecients to be similar to the estimates on overall usage in
Column 4 of Table 3. In practice, we see much stronger results in this case: all four measures of
benets and costs signicantly aect cup trial, and in the expected direction. Based on the brief
discussion above, this is consistent with over-optimism about success among girls with high benets
of usage. Of course, more would need to be done { likely with dierent data { to prove that this is
the mechanism behind the variation in coecients.
Summary
There are at least two important conclusions from these results on mechanisms. First, and
most importantly, from a positive standpoint our analysis of peer eects supports the theory that
peers matter in adoption because individuals learn about how to use the technology from them. In
contrast, we argue that peers do not matter through aecting individual wanting to use the new
technology, although our estimation has more limitations in this case.
Second, the combination of the evidence of the eects of benets and the evidence of the
eects of friendships eshes out the comparison of magnitudes in Section 3 and Figure 4. In that
case, we provided an analysis of which of these two avenues matters most, considering our specic
product. Based on our analysis of mechanisms, we argue that value-based targeting is likely to
dominate even more strongly for technologies that are easy to use. Because friends seem to matter
primarily for learning about how to use the product, without any variation in success probability,
friendship should not matter at all; further, the analysis of benet eects on trial suggest that
benets are even more predictive if we ignore the success margin. Given these two points,
value-based targeting will heavily dominate if a product is easy to use. In contrast, for a product
with limited heterogeneity in wanting to use, but a lot of variation in probability of success,
targeting on peer networks becomes more attractive. This is particularly true in cases where the goal
is to target fast adoption, since friends aect speed of adoption more than ultimate adoption.
24This suggests that, to the extent one wants to use these results to make statements about
other types of technologies, it is important to think about where these technologies lie on the
heterogeneity-in-value versus heterogeneity-in-success space. For a product like de-worming drugs,
where there is likely to be almost no heterogeneity in success, we would not expect to see peers aect
adoption, and targeting based on value is likely to be more successful. In contrast, for a complicated
technology { say, a computer { we would expect to see more eect of peers on adoption, and
peer-based targeting could be good, at least for short-term adoption.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the determinants of adoption of a new technology using data from a randomized
evaluation of menstrual cup provision in Nepal, focusing on the role of peer eects and technology
value in driving adoption. Despite the fact that the menstrual cup may not be per se the most
important technology, we argue that the data and setting have a number of advantages for this
analysis. First, the menstrual cup is a completely new and unfamiliar technology and it is somewhat
dicult to use, meaning that it shares features with a number of other important technologies (e.g.
fertilizer or contraceptives). Second, because we randomize at the individual level, we have
exogenous variation in peer exposure, which allows us to estimate causal peer eects. Third, our
data have suciently rich information on adoption { in particular, we observe both trial of the cup
and usage of the cup { that we are able to make progress on separating out the mechanisms by
which peers, in particular, aect adoption.
We nd strong evidence that both peer exposure and cup value drive adoption. Girls with
more treatment friends adopt much more quickly. The same is true of girls who we expect to get
greater benets from the cup { for example, those who work for pay and those who report spending
more time washing their menstrual cloths. Our analysis of mechanisms suggests that peers are
important for learning about how to use the product; however, they do not seem to play an
important role in driving individuals' wanting to use the product.
The results here may have policy implications which go beyond the particular case of the
menstrual cup. As we note above, this technology shares features { diculty of use, unfamiliarity {
with a variety of other important technologies. In many of these cases policy-makers face a choice
about how to distribute the technologies to maximize use. Assuming that not everyone will want to
use the a product, or be successful at using it, what is the right way to distributed a limited number
25of products? The results here shed some light on this issue, indicating that the appropriate targeting
is likely to depend on specic characteristics of the product { in particular, how much variation there
is in the likelihood of success.
In addition to these implications for policy, we believe the ndings in this paper may also
guide methodology. First, peer eects are more important in early months after product distribution.
This likely reects the concave nature of the value of information { some more information is very
helpful, moving from having a lot of information to even more is less helpful. This suggests there is
value in observing adoption over time. Had we observed cup usage only at the follow-up survey we
would have missed these eects. Second, the discussion of mechanisms here suggests that more data
on patterns of adoption { in particular, collecting more information about the way that individuals
are deciding whether or not to adopt { may be very valuable in understanding the mechanisms
through which these eects operate.
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Figure 2:
Menstrual Cup Trial and Usage Over Time
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Notes: This figure shows evolution of usage of the menstrual cup, over time.  Cups were distributed in November or December of 2006.  The labels indicate the 
number of individuals observed in each month.  There are a total of 101 treatment individuals.
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Figure 3
Estimated Effect of Treatment Friends on Menstrual Cup Usage, by Month
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Notes: This figure shows  coefficients on number of treatment friends interacted with month dummies from a regression where the dependent variable is 
menstrual cup usage.  ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
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Figure 4
Simulated Usage Under Different Cup Distribution Schemes
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Notes: This figure shows  the predicted usage under three different distribution schemes, based on our estimates in Section 4.  Value-based distribution means 
giving the cup to people with highest predicted cup value; peer-based distribution means distributing by peer networks to maximize average number of friends 
with the cup among girls who also have the cup
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Figure 5
Estimated Effect of Treatment Friends on Success at Using Menstrual Cup, by Month
OLS, Usage Conditional on Trial
Heckman Selection Model
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Notes: This figure shows  coefficients on number of treatment friends from a regression estimating usage success (usage conditional on trial, either adjusted or not 
adjusted for selection).  Regressions are run separately for each month. *** significant at 1% level;** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
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Figure 6
Estimated Effect of Treatment Friends on Wanting to Use Cup, by Month
Baseline, Naïve, Case
Estimates Calculated Based on Model 
Structure
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Notes: This figure shows first marginal effect estimates from a probit regression of cup trial on number of treatment friends (the OLS baseline results); the other series 
shows the estimates of the effect of treatment friends calculated based on the structure of the model in Section 5.  *** significant at 1% level.
31Table 1. Summary Statistics
Panel A: Number of Participants
Girls Mothers Female Relative
School 1 54 41 13
School 2 48 33 13
School 3 48 42 6
School 4 48 35 8
Panel B: Summary Statistics on Demographics
Mean Standard Deviation # of Observations
Age 14.2 1.23 197
7th Grade (0/1) .53 .50 198
Test Score Last Year -.08 1.18 198
Father Hindu Ethnicity .51 .50 198
Income Category 2.55 1.55 190
Mother's Yrs. Educ. 2.69 3.90 190
Father's Yrs. Educ. 5.61 4.70 190
Menses at baseline (0/1) .87 .33 197
Panel C: Summary Statistics on Analysis Variables
Mean Standard Deviation # of Observations
Work for Pay .45 .50 198
Minutes to School 14.6 9.0 197
Time to Wash Cloths 30.9 32.2 197
Ever used sanitary pads (0/1) .22 .41 197
Number of friends 3.78 1.35 198
Share of Friends Treatment .51 .27 196
Notes: This table shows simple summary statistics on sample sizes and basic demographics.
All girls were in either 7th or 8th grade. Age at menses and use of sanitary pads are
reported only for girls who have their menses at baseline. Total number of friends includes
all friends the individual lists, plus any people who list her as a friend. Income categories
range from 1-6, and correspond to yearly incomes of: Less than 25,000 Rs, 25k-50k, 50k-
75k, 75k-100k, 100-150k, 150k+.
32Table 2. Balancing Tests
Panel A: Balancing on Treatment and Control
Treat (n=101) Control (n=96)
Work for Pay .43 .47
Minutes to School 14.0 15.3
Time to Wash Cloths 29.7 32.2
Ever used sanitary pads (0/1) .20 .24
Number of friends 3.82 3.74
Share of Friends Treatment .52 .50
Age 14.21 14.23
7th Grade (0/1) .50 .55
Test Score Last Year -.17 .00
Father Hindu .50 .53
Income Category 2.49 2.62
Mother's Yrs. Educ. 2.48 2.91
Father's Yrs. Educ. 6.02 5.17
Menses at baseline (0/1) .92 .82
Panel B: Balancing on # Treatment Friends
Coe. on # of Treat. Friends (Std. Error)
Work for Pay .007 (.038)
Minutes to School -1.32 (.690)
Time to Wash Cloths 3.37 (2.47)
Ever used sanitary pads (0/1) -.006 (.031)
Age .090 (.094)
7th Grade (0/1) .006 (.038)
Test Score Last Year -.097 (.090)
Father Hindu .053 (.038)
Income Category -.132 (.121)
Mother's Yrs. Educ. -.199 (.306)
Father's Yrs. Educ. -.179 (.369)
Menses at baseline (0/1) -.027 (.025)
Standard errors in parenthesis.  signicant at 10%;  signicant at 5%;  signicant at
1%
Notes: This table shows balancing tests for the demographics and friend variables by
treatment and control and by number of treatment friends. Total number of friends
includes all friends the individual lists, plus any people who list her as a friend. Income
categories range from 1-6, and correspond to yearly incomes of: Less than 25,000 Rs,
25k-50k, 50k-75k, 75k-100k, 100-150k, 150k+.
33Table 3. Determinants of Menstrual Cup Adoption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Use Menstrual Cup During:
Mar, 2007 Aug, 2007 Jan, 2008 All Months All Months
Explanatory Variables:
# Treatment Friends :1154

(:031)
:074
(:056)
:0014
(:059)
:0839

(:032)
:1596

(:039)
# Total Friends  :0525

(:028)
 :0843

(:037)
:0193
(:043)
 :0383

(:021)
 :0711

(:027)
Work for Pay :3079

(:109)
:1951
(:13)
:1931

(:104)
:1946

(:075)
:0719
(:097)
Minutes to School  :0106

(:005)
 :0062
(:007)
 :0119

(:006)
 :0038
(:003)
 :0009
(:005)
Ever Use Pads :0341
(:096)
:1105
(:128)
 :1546
(:132)
 :0569
(:075)
:0836
(:092)
Time to Wash Rags :0048

(:002)
:0055

(:003)
:0061

(:002)
:003

(:001)
 :0001
(:001)
Months Since Distribution :0301

(:004)
:0258

(:015)
# Treat Friends  Month  :0108

(:004)
# Friends  Month :0042
(:003)
Work  Month :0119
(:009)
Mins to School  Month  :0004
(:001)
Use Pads  Month  :0174
(:012)
Wash Time  Month :0005

(:0001)
Age :0447
(:03)
:0363
(:047)
:0391
(:046)
:0422
(:026)
:0449

(:026)
Grade  :0562
(:063)
 :1793

(:091)
 :0795
(:09)
 :0409
(:049)
 :0527
(:047)
Ethnicity=Tebeto  :1112
(:103)
 :1391
(:134)
 :2349

(:102)
 :1416

(:052)
 :1423

(:051)
Ethnicity=Newar  :178
(:165)
 :0714
(:255)
 :2834
(:22)
 :1218
(:163)
 :127
(:154)
School 2  :2071

(:078)
 :2288

(:124)
 :1588
(:127)
 :1991

(:062)
 :1955

(:061)
School 3  :3671

(:082)
 :4277

(:142)
 :3223

(:173)
 :3675

(:084)
 :3546

(:082)
School 4  :5676

(:05)
 :547

(:119)
 :5178

(:149)
 :4761

(:061)
 :4669

(:061)
Noramalized Exam Score :0283
(:041)
:1048

(:057)
:0205
(:034)
:0318

(:02)
:0317

(:019)
Mother's Educ.  :0006
(:014)
:0242
(:019)
 :0095
(:017)
:0079
(:009)
:008
(:009)
Father's Educ.  :0028
(:014)
 :0192
(:016)
 :0202
(:016)
 :0076
(:007)
 :0088
(:007)
Family Income :1126

(:03)
:0395
(:042)
:0692

(:039)
:0449

(:021)
:043

(:021)
P-value, Joint Sig. of Value Vars. .06 .22 .06 .002 .010
Number of Obs. 87 74 73 772 772
Standard errors in parenthesis.
 signicant at 10%;
 signicant at 5%;
 signicant at 1%
Notes: This table shows the eect of cup benets, costs and peer exposure on usage. The rst three columns use one
month of data each; the fourth and fth column use all months of data, with standard errors clustered by individual.
34Table 4. Inuence of Friend Type on Menstrual Cup Adoption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Use Menstrual Cup During:
Mar, 2007 Aug, 2007 Jan, 2008 All Months All Months
Explanatory Variables:
# Strong Treat. Fr. :1607

(:05)
:1984

(:076)
:1931

(:095)
:1687

(:045)
:1694

(:061)
Total # Strong Fr.  :0623
(:045)
 :1651

(:06)
 :0272
(:064)
 :0727

(:032)
 :0965

(:044)
# Weak Treat. Fr. :0831

(:045)
:0082
(:065)
 :0139
(:053)
:0429
(:038)
:1326

(:044)
Total # Weak Fr.  :0397
(:032)
 :0521
(:043)
:0068
(:04)
 :0205
(:025)
 :0474
(:03)
Months Since Distribution :0305

(:004)
:025

(:015)
# Strong Treat Fr.  Month :0008
(:008)
# Strong Fr.  Month :0027
(:005)
# Weak Treat Fr.  Month  :0122

(:005)
# Weak Fr.  Month :0034
(:004)
Number of Obs. 87 74 73 772 772
COST/BENEFIT CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS YES YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parenthesis.
 signicant at 10%;
 signicant at 5%;
 signicant at 1%
Notes: This table shows the eect of peer exposure on usage separated out by friend type. The rst three columns use
data from three time periods; the fourth and fth column use all months of data, with standard errors clustered by
individual. Controls for cup cost/benets and demographics are included in all columns (the same controls as in Table
3). Strong friends: both list each other; Weak friends: respondent lists, friend does not list her or friend lists respondent,
not visa versa. We report the average marginal eect from Probit models.
35Table 5. Peer Eects on Menstrual Cup Usage Success
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Used Menstrual Cup
OLS: Used Conditional on Trial Heckman Selection Model
Selection: No Period This Month
Explanatory Variables:
# Treatment Friends :1182

(:036)
:1889

(:054)
:1092

(:029)
:1793

(:047)
# Total Friends  :0612

(:025)
 :0815

(:039)
 :0548

(:024)
 :0731

(:039)
Months Since Distribution :0388

(:005)
:0457

(:015)
:0376

(:005)
:0453

(:015)
# Treat Friends  Month  :0086

(:004)
 :0085

(:004)
# Friends  Month :0027
(:004)
:0024
(:004)
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS YES YES YES YES
Number of Obs. 562 562 772 772
Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered by individual.
 signicant at 10%;
 signicant at 5%;
 signicant at 1%
Notes: This table shows the estimates of the eect of peers on success at menstrual cup usage. The rst two columns
estimate OLS regression of usage conditional on trial; the third and fourth columns estimate Heckman selection models,
where the selection is on whether or not the individual tried, and the selector variables are \no period this month".
Controls for demographics are included in all columns (the same controls as in Table 3); however, no controls for benets
are included in this stage.
36Table 6. Peer, Benet and Cost Eects on Wanting to Use
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Tried Menstrual Cup Willingness to Pay
Baseline Structural Late Months
Estimates Only
Explanatory Variables:
# Treatment Friends :061

(:028)
:0895

(:037)
:0332
(:044)
:0165
(:039)
:0327
(:038)
174:8477
(132:477)
# Total Friends  :0243
(:018)
 :0371
(:026)
 :0133
(:026)
 115:2202
(110:835)
Work for Pay :0898

(:053)
 :0389
(:099)
:1371

(:062)
 384:6595
(300:259)
Minutes to School :0056

(:002)
:006
(:004)
:0055

(:003)
1:0636
(16:528)
Ever Use Pads  :1386

(:061)
 :0782
(:094)
 :1396

(:083)
 80:8246
(327:119)
Time to Wash Rags :0032

(:001)
:0038

(:001)
:0031

(:002)
2:1546
(4:361)
Months Since Distribution :0061
(:005)
:0058
(:013)
 :0048
(:0072)
# Treat Friends  Month  :0042
(:005)
:00001
(:009)
# Friends  Month :0018
(:004)
Work  Month :0167
(:011)
Mins to School  Month  :0001
(:0000)
Use Pads  Month  :0068
(:01)
Wash Time  Month  :0001
(:0001)
P-value, Joint Sig. of Value Vars. .0005 .001 .017 .75
DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS YES YES N/A N/A YES YES
Number of Obs. 772 772 772 772 432 65
Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered by individual.
 signicant at 10%;
 signicant at 5%;
 signicant at 1%
Notes: This table shows estimates of the eect of peers, costs and benets on wanting to use the cup. The rst two
columns show baseline eects of these variables on trial; the coecients on peers should not be interpreted as eects on
wanting to use. The third column provides estimates of friend eects on wanting to use based on structural assumptions
in the model (standard errors are bootstrapped). The fourth column provides these estimate based on the assumption
that probability of success in late months is high. The fth column estimates eects on reported willingness to pay for
the cup at follow-up. Controls for demographics are included in all columns (the same controls as in Table 3).
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